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Executive Summary 
he EU has repeatedly confirmed its position that the global, annual mean surface temperature 
should  not  increase  by  more  than  2°C  above  pre-industrial  levels.  In  order  to  fulfil  its 
commitment, the EU has adopted a wide range of sector-specific and cross-sectoral measures, 
built around the flagship EU emissions trading system (ETS). A number of Roadmaps have been 
worked out to develop consistent emissions reduction trajectories up to 2050.  
1.  Climate change is one of the most important policy fields of the EU. It aspires to lead global 
efforts to fight climate change but also to meet the ambitious goals of its economic growth 
strategy and to maintain the Union’s standing globally. The EU ETS is the central pillar of a 
package of regulatory measures to address climate change, energy security and competitiveness, 
and  notably  to  achieve  the  EU’s  2050  GHG  emissions  reduction  target.  An  efficient  and 
effective EU ETS is the precondition for the EU to achieve its short- and long-term climate and 
other policy goals.  
2.  The 2008 Review was meant to adapt the ETS so that it could cope with the uncertainties of 
international climate change negotiations as well as the fluctuations of the economic cycles. 
Primarily due to the unprecedented recession and the accompanying decline in demand for EU 
allowances, the EU carbon price has fallen to substantially lower price levels than expected. 
Additional downward pressure on price has emerged from access to international credits and 
interaction with other policies. And many analysts believe the price will stay lower than was 
expected  when  the  ETS  review  was  completed.  The  deep  recession  has  highlighted  that 
unpredictable circumstances not related to the functioning of the ETS itself, such as dramatic 
macroeconomic changes, can affect the ETS’ ability to effectively achieve its objectives. To 
address  this  ‘temporary’  market  imbalance,  on  25  July  2012,  the  European  Commission 
formally proposed to ‘backload’ the auctioning of EU Allowances (EUAs), i.e. to stagger the 
release of large numbers of EUAs. This would mean that fewer EUAs are released initially and 
a larger number would be released at a later date towards the end of the trading period in 2020. 
At the same time, the European Commission initiated a discussion on the need for ‘structural’ 
measures, in particular to address the root cause of the current imbalance.  
3.  The stark reduction of demand for EU allowances as a result of the decline in industrial output 
will  continue  to  affect  the  ETS  beyond  the  current  and  subsequent  compliance  periods.  In 
addition, it influences market expectations. This will impact companies’ investment decisions. 
Investment in new low-carbon plant will only be made if the underlying investment is sound. 
These  decisions  are  governed  by  sector-  and  company-specific  economic  factors,  such  as 
environmental legislation, product demand, energy prices, impact on existing plant, etc. The 
carbon price will only influence the type of investment by making high-carbon investments less 
profitable. Thus the carbon price will not drive new investment but will strongly motivate low-
carbon investments when investment decisions are made. 
4.  Whilst there is a broad consensus in the EU that a robust carbon market is required in order to 
drive  the  carbon  price  necessary  for  low-carbon  investment,  stakeholders  appear  to  have 
different opinions on what the EU ETS stands for. Some see it primarily as a compliance tool, 
i.e. to “promote reductions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner” as mentioned 
in Article 1 of the Directive. Others see the ETS at the same time as a driver to shift investments 
towards  low-carbon  technologies,  which  has  been  one  of  the  objectives  of  the  2008  ETS 
Review.  
5.  As long as these differences cannot be reconciled, the likelihood that some member states will 
implement national measures to encourage low-carbon investments will increase. While it might 
be possible to embed some member-state actions into an EU framework, in other instances this 
could mean that the EU-wide carbon price signal will increasingly be blurred, weakening an 
undistorted carbon price across the EU internal market, the achievement of which was one of 
the central objectives of the ETS. The more specific are the signals to investors, the more the 
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universality  of  the  price  signal  suffers.  This  would  make  climate  policy  deliberately  more 
costly, at a time when the EU is reflecting on a longer-term strategy after the economic recovery 
and a renewed international dynamism following the Durban climate change negotiations in 
December 2011.  
6.  Various  stakeholders  have  proposed  different  measures.  Even  if  there  is  no  agreement  on 
whether action is actually needed, there is value in assessing the relative merits of the proposed 
measures and especially on how they fare in the context of the arguments made in the previous 
paragraph. The starting point of such a reflection should always be to let the existing system 
work, thereby testing whether the ETS design is able to address current challenges. There is a 
risk the ETS will be damaged by introducing new measures. Another principle of the analysis is 
the requirement to find a balance between stability of a government-made and -steered market 
and the flexibility to incorporate new information. A final element of the reflection on whether 
to take measures or not should be an assessment of the risks that non-action entails. 
7.  In the event that EU policy-makers conclude that action should be taken, there was a strong 
preference within the Task Force for a systemic solution, i.e. ensuring that the ETS will be able 
to cope with extraordinary circumstances in the future. A precondition for any measure will be 
its ability to align the short and long term to create a steady carbon price signal that provides 
incentives  in  a  coherent  way  to  investors.  A  systemic  solution does not  exclude  a one-off 
measure, e.g. to address the ‘oversupply’ of EU allowances as a result of the recession; the any 
such measure, however, would need to be consistent with the principles formulated above.  
This report assesses the pros and cons of the various possible measures as well as the combinations of 
measures that have been put forward by different stakeholders to address the level and stability of the 
price of carbon. These measures are divided into four broad categories: doing nothing, one-off (re-
setting)  measures,  automatic  or  ‘dynamic’  adjustment  provisions  to  the  economic  cycle  and 
institutional adjustments, i.e. the adaptation of existing or the creation of new organisations.  
The report argues that the need for some kind of ‘dynamic’ adjustment provision should be considered 
very seriously by the European Commission, the member states, the European Parliament and other 
stakeholders to address the relatively inelastic supply. The report also suggests that there is a need to 
consider ways to improve communication of market-sensitive information for example by leaving the 
management of the ETS to a specialised body. 
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Reviewing the EU ETS Review? 
Report of a CEPS Task Force 
1.  Introduction  
For many years now, the EU has identified tackling climate change as one of the world’s greatest 
challenges. It has repeatedly confirmed its position that an increase in the global annual mean surface 
temperature should not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Climate change has become a very 
important EU policy domain, not only with respect to EU leadership to fight climate change but also 
as a centrepiece to the “Europe 2020” economic growth strategy, which has identified “sustainable 
growth” to promote a more resource-efficient, greener and more competitive economy as one of its 
five pillars. Finally, climate change has been identified as an area which has strengthened the EU’s 
standing in the world, one of the principal objectives of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Both before and after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU adopted numerous laws to 
fulfil its commitments and to prepare the path for a new post-2012 agreement or at least a framework. 
Among  them  were  a  host  of  policies  to  support  renewable  energy,  improve  energy  efficiency, 
decarbonise transport and a low-carbon technology deployment strategy, which led to the Climate and 
Energy Package adopted in late 2008. An important feature of the package was the attempt to integrate 
different  policies,  especially  but  not  only  the  EU  Emissions  Trading  System  (ETS),  renewables 
support and energy efficiency policy. The integrated character has been documented in a number of 
Impact Assessments that, among other things, calculated the interaction of different policies with a 
view to implement a least-cost policy whilst taking into consideration the political preferences of 
different member states and the distributional implications. In the follow-up to the adoption of the 
package, the European Commission published three Roadmaps – one economy-wide and two dealing 
with transport and energy respectively – to set out trajectories for reaching EU’s 2050 targets of 80-
95% GHG reductions by 2050 compared to 1990. In all these analyses, the EU emissions trading 
system (ETS), which started in 2005, continued and was expected to continue to occupy centre stage, 
partly also reflecting the political and other capital that has been invested in this tool.  
After its entry into force in 2005, the ETS encountered what could be called ‘teething problems’, 
which have subsequently been addressed in steps, notably by the second National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs) and then by the 2007-08 ETS review that had already been scheduled in the Directive (see 
Ellerman et al., 2010). Experiences from phase 1 and 2 have greatly helped the European Commission 
to propose and adopt far-reaching changes to the EU ETS.
1 One of them is a single EU-wide cap, 
which will decrease annually in a linear way by 1.74% starting in 2013 and without a sunset clause. 
At the time of the compromise conclusion on the ETS review for post-2012, there was a general 
conviction that the new ETS would be ‘future-proof’, i.e. able to cope with the temporary lack of a 
global climate change agreement, to address international competitiveness issues, yet able to drive de-
carbonisation of the EU economy. The 2008/9 economic crisis put into question that conviction by a 
dramatic lowering of EUA prices due to rapid and dramatic decline in economic output.
 2 Ever since 
then, EUA prices have been lingering around €6-8 per tonne of CO2 and few expect EUA prices to 
climb much higher than € 20 at best throughout the period up to 2020, with even that increase caused 
by  the possibility  of banking unused  allowances between  the  second  and  third phase.  There  is  a 
possibility that the oversupply apparent in the 3
rd phase (2013-20) may continue even beyond 2020. 
                                                   
1 See e.g. Ellerman et al. (2010), Skjærseth & Wettestad (2010) and Egenhofer et al. (2011) for a full overview. 
2 As early as the first half of 2010 the European Commission (2010b, p. 3) adjusted its projections for the 2020 
carbon price from approximately €32 in its 2008 impact assessment, “in case of full implementation of the 
package (including renewables policies and maximum use of international credits) […to] €16 in 2020 (including 
renewables policies to meet the 20% target, without necessitating international credits)”. 2 | EGENHOFER, MARCU & GEORGIEV 
 
Against this background stakeholders have called for “corrective” measures. However, there is neither 
a consensus on whether the lowering of the EUA price is indeed a problem, as opposed to a logical 
consequence of the system applying to a situation where economic recession was delivering lower 
emissions by itself, nor how to address it – for those who agree that there is a need to act. Many 
different ideas have been put forward. They include leaving the ETS as is, complementing the price 
signal by regulation, for example in the form of power plant CO2 emissions standards, a set aside to 
retire ‘excess’ allowances, providing an additional signal of scarcity by a binding 2030 target, more in 
line  with  the  EU’s  long-term  climate  change  targets,  technical  fixes  of  the  ETS  functioning,  a 
managed carbon price, or supplementary measures by member states to support investment.  
To address this ‘temporary’ market imbalance, on 25 July 2012, the European Commission formally 
proposed
3 to stagger the release of EU Allowances (EUAs), a practice that is generally referred to as 
‘back-loading’. Once adopted, this would mean that fewer EUAs were released for auction initially 
and  more  later,  towards  the  end  of  the  trading  period  in  2020.  At  the  same  time,  the  European 
Commission initiated a discussion on the need for ‘structural’ measures, in particular to address the 
root cause of the current imbalance.  
Consultation on back-loading is under way with the final decision possibly being expected in the first 
quarter of 2013. This report does not discuss the back-loading proposal. Instead it focuses on longer-
term debate issue and attempts to make an early contribution to the debate on whether there is a need 
for structural measures. This report reviews the arguments in this – on-going – debate, and sets out to 
analyse  the  possible  implications  of  different  options  that  have  been  put  forward  by  different 
stakeholders. Options will be roughly divided into four sets of approaches; first, “doing nothing”, 
second,  what  will  be  called  “one-off  measures”  that  change  the  parameters of  the  market,  third, 
“automatic adjustment provisions”, i.e. mechanisms inherent to the ETS with the objective of keeping 
demand and supply broadly in balance; and fourth, “institutional adjustments”, meaning the creating 
of bodies or institutions designed to ensure and efficient functioning of the market. Some of the 
instruments will address the EU level while others operate at member state level. Before undertaking 
this assessment in chapter 4, the preceding chapters 2 and 3 will ask about the need for and possible 
unintended consequences of such measures, respectively.  
2.  The role of the ETS price signal and its influence on investment 
There are different views on what the ETS is meant for, within the EU and perhaps even within the 
European Commission, as between the different institutions, member states and stakeholders. There is 
consensus  –  as  evidenced  in  Art.  1  of  the  Directive  –  that  the  ETS  is  a  tool  for  cost-effective 
abatement. Yet, there is no consensus what this means in practice. Some argue that the ETS’ objective 
is also to “promote” (high cost) low-carbon technologies such as CCS by adding weight to the case in 
favour of investment; others say that only affected companies and the market can choose whether 
investment, at a particular time, is the most cost-effective way of achieving a given level of emissions 
reductions. Some stakeholders want a flow of income from auctions of ETS units at a ‘good’ price. 
Then there is the goal of fostering the global carbon market. Views and approaches to the current 
situation depend to a good degree on preferences and priorities with regard to the ETS’ purpose. 
As a first step and in order to structure the debate on the future of the ETS, this report identifies a need 
to discuss the objectives of the ETS in view with finding a consensus. If Art. 1 of the ETS Directive to 
promote GHG reductions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner is read as “to reach a 
given GHG emissions target in the most cost-effective way”, the ETS might not in all circumstances 
                                                   
3 The proposal consists of the following elements: i) A proposal to amend the EU ETS Directive and clarify the 
prerogative of the EC to make changes to the auctioning profile within a trading period through the Climate 
Change Committee; ii) An amendment to the Auctioning Regulation that does not include number, and iii) A 
Staff Working Document (SWD) that outlines, in some detail, the rationale behind back-loading as well as at 
least three different options on how to implement such action. The SWD showed, by calculations using three 
different models, the potential impact of back loading.  REVIEWING THE EU ETS REVIEW? | 3 
 
be  able  to  create  “the  right  incentives  for  forward  looking  low  carbon  investment  decisions  by 
reinforcing a clear, undistorted and long-term carbon price signal”,
4 one of the secondary objectives. 
Member states may look to complementary measures to achieve these secondary objectives.  
2.1  Carbon-related investment drivers  
From the above, it appears that a key question is how the ETS and its price signal actually affects 
investment  and  its  role  in  driving,  or  failing  to  drive,  the  transformation  towards  a  low-carbon 
economy  in  Europe.  Investment  in  new  low-carbon  plant  will  only  be  made  if  the  underlying 
investment is sound. These decisions are governed by sector- and company-specific economic factors 
such as environmental legislation, product demand, energy prices, impact on existing plant, etc. The 
carbon  price  will  only  influence  the  type  of  investment  by  making  high-carbon  investments  less 
profitable. Thus the carbon price will not drive new investment but will strongly incentivise low-
carbon investments when investment decisions are made. 
Companies will always finance those investments that immediately generate profits. As to the carbon 
price impact, under current ETS rules, this means within the current known period for which the 
allocation is fixed, i.e. up to 2020. The EU Allowance price is an important – although not the only – 
element  in  this  calculation.  Hence  decisions  on  whether  to  invest  in  innovative  low-carbon 
technologies depend – at least to a degree – on the number of allowances, which are allocated or 
inherited  and  the  CO2  price,  which  changes  the  cost/benefit  ratio.  Hence,  these  investments  are 
sensitive to the CO2 price. In addition, other parameters such as price expectations, life-cycle analysis, 
the total cost of ownership (TCO) and also investment-years and cash issues, including access to and 
the cost of capital, matter in a decision whether to invest or not.  
For the long-term however, the situation is different. It is difficult for market participants to form long-
term views. Despite the linear annual reduction factor of 1.74% as of 2013, the Directive foresees a 
revision of the cap in the case of a global climate change agreement. The current cap based on the 
linear reduction factor is also not in line with EU and international climate change objectives or the 
most common interpretation of climate science. And many businesses remain suspicious about the 
stability  of  political  decisions.  As  a  result,  there  are  credibility  problems.  These  could  be partly 
resolved by the adoption of a global climate change agreement. If such an agreement is not reached, an 
EU strategy ‘going it alone’ in line with its long-term 2050 target is most likely not credible enough to 
trigger investment on its own as investors would need to consider the risk that a strong unilateral EU 
position might be revised.  
As a conclusion, we can say that the ETS is driving profitable investment in the short-term, i.e. over 
the allocation period. The allowance price matters although is only one of the factors, even if an 
important one (see Neuhoff, 2011). However, investment decisions are not made irrespective of the 
long-term outlook in the form of the long-term target, market expectations but also the credibility of 
the projected target and resulting prices. For the longer-term, there is a high level of uncertainty, 
essentially associated with the current lack of a global climate change agreement, and a low current 
price appears to make banking on a high later one more risky. Whilst bringing current ETS design 
better in line with the EU long-term target, this will not be able to address uncertainty in full. In 
addition, there are numerous barriers to investment, related to the functioning of and regulation in the 
internal  energy  market.  This  is  to  be  compared with  a  situation  of  a high  level  of  certainty  for 
investment in renewables.  
2.2  Implications of the absence of a global agreement 
One of the (implicit) assumptions when the ETS was originally designed (in 2000-03) was that there 
would be some sort of "legally-binding comprehensive global agreement on climate change" within a 
                                                   
4 This is the text of the second objective of the 2007-08 ETS Review that the European Commission (2008b, p.3) 
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reasonable time for the post-2012 period. With the diminishing likelihood of this happening, the ETS 
Review  (implicitly)  attempted  to  make  the  ‘new’  ETS  future-proof,  i.e.  able  to  cope  with  the 
temporary lack of a global climate change agreement. Key elements were the unilateral 20% reduction 
target for 2020, which imposes a legally-binding carbon constraint irrespective of a global agreement. 
The first ETS phase showed how difficult it is to impose a cap without a legally binding carbon 
constraint.  
In addition, the unilateral target has been complemented by technology deployment strategies for 
renewables,  CCS (carbon  capture  and  storage),  energy  technologies  through  the  Strategic  Energy 
Technology (SET) Plan and transport as well as a host of other – accompanying – policies. In addition, 
benchmark-based  free  allocation  provides  a  subsidy/compensation  for  the  industrial  sector  while 
avoiding (in most cases) excessive windfall profits. For electricity-intensive industries, the EU will 
allow member states to grant state aid to compensate for a potential loss of competitiveness. 
3.  Is there a case for action? 
The extraordinary economic circumstances of the 2008-09 crisis – a once-in-a-lifetime recession – 
have meant that EU ETS emissions are considerably lower than originally expected when emissions 
objectives were set. Lower economic activity has reduced demand for EUAs while supply is fixed. 
This has led to demands for intervention in the market to support the price.
5 The opposite view holds 
that the EU ETS does what is was meant to do, namely “promote GHG reductions in a cost-effective 
and  economically  efficient  manner”  (Art.  1  of  the  ETS  Directive),  and  the  fact  that  emissions 
reduction targets are being achieved at lower a price is an example of its helpful counter-cyclical 
action and something to be thankful for and not to worry about.  
Figure 3.1 Expected over-supply of EU allowances 
 
Source: IETA. 
Although the overarching objective is cost-effectiveness of a politically given target, this cannot under 
all circumstances be construed as a call for the lowest possible EU allowance price. While the ‘lowest 
possible cost argument’ can hold true in the short-term, for example to reach the 2020 targets, it masks 
the fact that over the long-term – 2050 and beyond – an efficient climate change policy will need to 
accelerate the development and diffusion of existing and new low-carbon technologies. It would be 
logical to assume that the EU ETS should contribute to this objective. This is for example reflected in 
the 2008 Commission Proposal to amend the ETS Directive, which has identified three objectives for 
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the Review, of which two are still relevant today: 1) “Fully exploiting the potential of the EU ETS to 
contribute to the EU's overall GHG reduction commitments in an economically efficient manner” and, 
2) “Contributing to transforming Europe into a low greenhouse-gas-emitting economy and creating the 
right  incentives  for  forward  looking  low  carbon  investment  decisions  by  reinforcing  a  clear, 
undistorted and long-term carbon price signal” (European Commission 2008b, p. 3).
6 Recital 13 of the 
revised  Directive  states  the  objective  as  being  to  provide  longer-term  incentives  for  low-carbon 
investment and innovation to “deliver gradual and predictable reduction of emissions over time”.  
3.1.1  Inefficient use of capital  
If  the  short-term price  signal  differs  significantly  from  these  objectives,  the  investment  signal  is 
blurred. At best, this leads to investment deferral; at worst to ‘stranded assets’. Power generators have 
complained about a lack of clear investment signals, which make them defer investment. Reasons for 
this are broader than the ETS and include barriers within the internal energy market (see below). The 
fact  of  investment  deferral  does  not  necessarily  extend  to  all  technologies.  In  addition,  other 
instruments  than  the  ETS  may  be needed  to provide  support for  these  long-lived  assets,  such  as 
regulation or technology support policies (see CDC 2012). Low carbon prices fail to spur innovation, 
making technology learning curves in the future too high, again raising overall compliance costs. 
Another frequent argument frequently for ‘price stabilisation’ is that in the face of the low carbon 
price companies may continue investing in carbon-intensive capital stock. The high sunk costs of these 
investments would then make these investments “stranded”, making target achievement more costly 
from an economy-wide perspective. However, investment levels in a recession are generally very low. 
In addition, as we have seen in 2.1, there are other investment drivers than carbon, many of which 
favour more efficient technologies. .  
3.1.2  Volatility is a barrier to investment 
In many markets, there are concerns about price volatility. This is particularly true for a relatively new 
market and one that is purely regulatory, i.e. created and designed by governments. Price volatility can 
function as an additional barrier to investment. Volatility is closely linked to the level of liquidity. 
High liquidity dampens it.  
Consistently low EUA prices are likely to lead to the exit of many liquidity players, resulting in a 
much less liquid market than would otherwise be the case, thereby potentially increasing volatility. 
Also, markets where either supply or demand is relatively inelastic, tend to be volatile
7. ETS supply is 
particularly inelastic, in fact unchangeable because set by the cap, which is in turn is fixed very long 
term (see e.g. Grubb, 2012). Borrowing between the phases is not allowed. At the same time, ETS, 
demand can change significantly, depending to a large extent on the level of economic activity and 
commodity prices (i.e. coal/gas spreads) and availability of fuels (to address security of supply). This 
is at least the case as long as arbitrage between fuels is not driven by CO2 prices but by commodity 
prices.  While  the  once-in-a-lifetime  recession  might  be  over  soon,  a  possible  second  recession 
following one or several sovereign debt defaults is possible. Similarly, development of shale gas in the 
EU could dramatically alter emissions. Other ‘shocks’ are plausible, theoretically resulting in price 
volatility. Some argue that back loading would increase volatility (e.g. Verdonk & Vollebergh, 2012).  
3.2  Things are happening on the ground 
This longer-term perspective is why in response to the observed fall in prices, some stakeholders 
began openly arguing that the carbon price is “too low” and therefore insufficient to incentivise low-
                                                   
6 The third, “refining and improving the EU ETS in the light of experience gathered” has been accomplished and 
has lost its relevance for our discussions. 
7 Commodity markets typically exhibit “price volatility” because either supply or demand is rigid, or as in some 
cases, both (e.g. crude oil, natural gas). 6 | EGENHOFER, MARCU & GEORGIEV 
 
carbon investment, especially on a longer-term perspective
8. Theoretically, incentives for low-carbon 
investment could be achieved by complementary measures, e.g. regulation or taxes or via ‘re-setting’ 
the ETS.  
If a quantity-based instrument is chosen, however, the result is always that the cap of the carbon 
market determines the carbon price. The market will find the price that emitters must pay to stay under 
the cap. It is somewhat contradictory then to criticize the ETS on the grounds that the carbon price is 
“too low”. If the objective is determined in terms of quantity, the price is only the transmitter of the 
costs by which that objective is achieved. Hence, the question is whether the ETS – its principal merit 
being least-cost abatement – is the right instrument. Larsson & Lönnroth (2010) for example have 
proposed adjusting the ETS – by issuing or withholding emissions rights – more frequently to stabilise 
the  ETS  price  along  a  pre-determined  trajectory,  which  is  thought  to  be  high  enough  to  trigger 
innovation  and  investment  thereby  creating  a  positive  climate  investment  framework.  The  UK 
government has proposed introducing a carbon floor price via a tax (see below). The idea of an auction 
reserve price aims in the same direction (see section 4.2 and also Grubb, 2012). 
DG Climate Action, supported by some member states and stakeholders (see e.g. UK Parliament, 2011 
for the memorandum by Shell), has raised the idea of a set-aside (of allowances). Such a set-aside was 
formally proposed on 20 December 2011 by the European Parliament as an additional amendment to 
the proposal for an Energy Efficiency Directive. The European Parliament Environment Committee 
proposed to withdraw 1.4 billion allowances from the market during Phase 3. The stated justification 
was “to compensate for the implementation of [the Energy Efficiency] Directive” and “to restore the 
price mechanism to levels envisaged in the impact assessment”. The proposal was supported by the 
European Parliament, including by the Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE
9); but despite 
the removal of the specific allowance quantity from the text, a majority was not found during the 
negotiations between Council and the EP. However, in response to the proposal, the market initially 
surged – with EUA prices rising 30% the day of the announcement, only to fall again later.  
Concerned by the low carbon price and the absence of a prospect for immediate action, the  UK 
government has introduced a price floor that also covers EU ETS sectors, starting in 2013 (for details 
and analysis, see section 4.2 below). The law makes suppliers of fossil fuels for power generation 
liable  either  to  the  UK  Climate  Change  Levy  or  a  fuel  duty  (see  HM  Treasury  2010,  2011; 
MacKenzie, 2011).  
The government of Poland proposes to concentrate on longer-term and more structural changes to the 
ETS to address a real or perceived lack of incentive. They include the coverage of additional sectors 
such as international and inland transport modes, enlarging the ETS to the countries of the European 
Energy  Community  or  in  accordance  with  the  Neighbourhood  policy
10,  as  well  as  changing  the 
allocation methodologies to better align security of energy supply and competitiveness objectives with 
the  ETS  and  thereby,  ultimately,  create  better  incentives  for  low-carbon  development  (Bolesta, 
2012).
11 
                                                   
8On 15 December 2011, a number of European companies wrote in a letter to Commission President Barroso 
that the EU must strengthen its emissions trading system to help carbon prices recover from a four-year low and 
encourage investment in low-carbon green technologies. 
9 See European Parliament (2012), Energy savings: committee backs binding national targets and CO2 set aside 
plan,  retrieved  on  18  October  2012  from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120227IPR39335/html/Energy-savings-committee-
backs-binding-national-targets-and-CO2-set-aside-plan  
10 European Neighbourhood Policy describs the framework that governs the relationship between the EU and 
most of its neighbouring countries.  
11 See presentation by Krzysztof Bolesta, Ministry of Environment, Poland at the ETS TF meeting in Warsaw, 4 
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Throughout the discussions on possible action, energy and electricity-intensive industry has remained 
concerned about possible impacts on competitiveness and how they will be addressed. 
Box 3.1 The Energy Efficiency Directive: main provisions and relevance to the EU ETS 
Spearheaded by DG Energy, the new Energy Efficiency Directive
12 stipulates a number of measures by 
member states to contribute
13 to the EU target of 20% primary energy savings in 2020 compared to 
projected levels. The main provisions of the Directive require each member state to set an indicative 
national energy efficiency target, to ensure energy companies achieve on average by 2020 1.5% annual 
savings in energy sales volumes to final customers, to reach a renovation rate of 3% annually for public 
buildings owned by the central government, and to draw up a long-term strategy for encouraging the 
energy-saving renovation of the national stock of all residential and commercial buildings (Council of 
the EU, 2012). Other provisions include for example those on energy audits and energy management for 
large firms, on metering, on billing information, on district heating and cooling, on public procurement, 
on energy transformation, transmission and distribution, on energy services etc.  
These measures also affect the ETS sectors, because of the regulatory tools they add on top of the ETS 
incentives. In spite of the proposal for a set-aside not going through, a provision that the Commission 
must  “monitor”  the  interaction  effects  between  the  two  policies  has  been  retained:  “In  the 
implementation of the 20 % energy efficiency target, the Commission will have to monitor the impact of 
new  measures on Directive 2003/87/EC establishing the  Union's emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 
order to maintain the incentives in the emissions trading system rewarding low carbon investments and 
preparing the ETS sectors for the innovations needed in the future” (European Parliament and Council of 
the EU 2012, p.28). 
 
3.3  Interactions between different climate and other policies  
Downward pressure on carbon prices is reinforced by the interaction of climate and other policies at 
EU and non-EU level. The EU’s Climate and Energy Package of 2009 set a target not only to reduce 
emissions by 20% relative to 1990 levels, but also to have 20% of energy consumption sourced from 
renewables and to improve energy efficiency by 20%, all by 2020.  In contrast to the two former 
targets, the energy efficiency goal is not binding.  
The three policies were aimed at different objectives, yet  created interactions. In the first impact 
assessment of the binding targets on emission reduction and renewables in 2008, the Commission had 
already stressed the importance of assessing the interaction between policy instruments in the two 
fields.
14  But  since  design  of  the policies  was  uncertain –  e.g.  it  was  unclear  whether  the  energy 
efficiency ‘target’ became legally binding or not – a strict quantification proved difficult.  
By trying to quantify the possible complementarity of the targets to reduce GHG emissions by 20% 
and to achieve a 20% share of renewable energy consumption (see table 3.1), the Impact Assessment 
shows that implementing policies which are only oriented towards one of the two targets will not be 
sufficient to achieve both of them. In addition, the effect of meeting only the renewables commitment 
on total GHG reduction is more pronounced than vice-versa (change from -1.5% to -9.3% vs. change 
from 12.5% to 15.8%). However, policies such as supporting renewables or energy efficiency which 
                                                   
12 For the final text of the Energy Efficiency Directive, see European Parliament and Council of the EU (2012). 
For the Impact Assessment, see European Commission  
13 It is expected that the provisions of the Directive in its final version will result in a 17 % improvement in 
energy efficiency by 2020, while other measures will complement it to reach the 20 % target (Council of the EU, 
2012).  In  2014 the  Commission  will  review  the  overall  progress  towards  the 20% target  and  will  propose 
mandatory national energy efficiency targets, if it is insufficient (European Commission 2011a). 
14 European Commission (2008), Annex to the Impact Assessment: Document Accompanying the Package of 
Implementation  Measures  for  the  EU's  Objectives  on  Climate  Change  and  Renewable  Energy  for  2020, 
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directly or indirectly interact with an ETS will not contribute to overall emission reductions since they 
will simply ‘free-up’ allowances, which may used by other participants”.
15  
Promoting  renewables  and  energy  efficiency  in  parallel  to  the  ETS  has  and  can  be  justified  to 
overcome market failures.
16 At the same time, this establishes a structural interaction between these 
policies and the ETS.
17 For example after approval of the Energy Efficiency Directive, the EUA price 
fell significantly (see Figure 3.2). 
Additional downward pressure on carbon prices emerges from access to international credits, created 
by the Kyoto Protocol (JI/CDM). In its 2008 impact assessment, the Commission had estimated the 
CO2 price to fall by 13.2 €/t CO2 if up to a quarter of the emission reduction effort was derived from 
JI/CDM credits.
18 The economic crisis, though also increased energy efficiency measures, has led to a 
banking of both ETS allowances and international credits, as pointed out by the Commission in its 
2010 communication
19 (see Figure 3.3). 
 
 
 
                                                   
15 Ibid., p. 134. 
16 S. Sorrell (ed., 2003), Interaction in EU Climate Policy: Final Report, SPRU - Science and Technology Policy 
Research,  retrieved  1  October  2012,  http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/research/project 
archive/projarch12, p. 84. 
17 The analysis focuses on the price issue since other interactions are much less clear-cut (but see NERA (2005), 
Interactions of the EU ETS with Green and White Certificate Schemes: Summary Report for Policy Makers, 
November,  retrieved  1  October  2012,  http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/ 
research/projectarchive/projarch12).  According  to  the  European  Commission  (2008),  Annex  to  the  Impact 
Assessment, op. cit., p. 35, meeting the GHG commitment without renewable policies would require a carbon 
price of 49 €/t CO2, which would drop to 39 €/t CO2 if the renewables target was reached as well. 
18 European Commission (2008), Annex to the Impact Assessment, op. cit., p. 71. 
 
Figure 3.2 EUA price development from February 2008 – January 2012 
 
Source: CDC (2012), The EU ETS carbon price: To intervene, or not to intervene? CDC Climate 
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In  2010,  the  European  Commission  indicated  that  compared  to  the  2009  baseline,  banking  of 
allowances and international credits in the Commission’s reference scenario would continue until 2016 
and have a lasting effect if the climate and energy package was fully implemented, i.e. all targets 
achieved (see Figure 3.3). As a consequence, even in 2030 the carbon price would still be only around 
€20.
20  
Other policies at EU, member state or even at international level can create interactions. They include 
for example EU directives such as the Large Combustion Plant Directive, the Mercury Convention or 
the Community projects (under Art. 24a of the ETS Directive
21).  
This short analysis has shown that many interactions between policies exist. Successful policies to 
promote  renewable  energy  sources  and  energy  efficiency  are  especially  lowering  the  EUA  price. 
However, it is difficult to predict or even to project the exact influence. Predictability somewhat 
increases  the  more  EU  policies  on  renewables  and  energy  efficiency  are  harmonised  and  legally 
binding. Still, it will be difficult or next to impossible to project interactions. This gives support to the 
idea of having some sort of adjustment mechanism, able to deal with changes in demand, at least as 
long as there are other targets or policies than the ETS that affect carbon prices. Even if the EU 
refrains from renewable or energy efficiency  targets, as long as  the policies  in these areas exists 
interactions will continue to exist as well. The same is true with other non-climate policies that have 
been mentioned above.  
3.4  Predictability and Regulatory Stability 
A critical element of the ETS is predictability and stability. This also holds true if changes are called 
for, because circumstances differ. Changes in design or policy are required to allow governments to 
repeatedly  incorporate new  information  and  to  increase  or  reduce  the  pace of  the  transition  over 
several decades to a low-carbon economy. This will need to respect the (legal) procedures that have 
been set out ex ante, and to follow certain rules related to lead-time or to avoid ex-post changes that 
                                                   
20 Ibid., p. 34. 
21 For more details, see e.g. Climate Strategies 2012. 
Figure 3.3 Emissions and allowances/credits in the Commission’s baseline 
scenario 
 
Source: European Commission (2010), Commission Staff Working Document 
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would  undermine  credibility  with  market  participants  and  stability,  and  therefore  undermine  the 
visibility of the price signal, the core of the ETS. The ETS foresees such changes only by way of 
reviews (specified in the Directive) or by political decisions, with the most important being an increase 
of the level of ambition in the case of a global climate change agreement being struck. However, these 
changes are infrequent or exceptional. 
Also interaction of member states’ policies with the ETS can undermine predictability and stability. 
This is particularly so where member states’ policies counteract ETS incentives.  
‘Ad-hoc’  intervention  in  the  ETS,  whether  for reasons of  price  support  or  other  purposes,  risks 
undermining predictability and regulatory stability and therefore can make matters worse. Opinions 
differ widely on what kind of “action” could jeopardise the objective of stability and predictability. 
This is partly so because stakeholders’ views strongly depend on their sector, i.e. industrial, power, 
refining or financial services. For those sectors which will require urgent investment, e.g. power, the 
answer is likely to be different than for those sectors that do not foresee such investment. The financial 
sector tends to attach a lot of importance to stability and predictability of the market. Some feel that 
the potential tools to address the current low ETS price (see below) could not meet the conditions of 
‘stability/predictability” as laid out above, while others feel that market ‘action now’ is needed to 
allow the ETS to deliver on its (secondary) objectives such as driving decarbonisation etc.  
4.  What measures if any? 
The following section assesses the relative merits of different tools in addressing the problem of 
currently low ETS prices. It reviews the various instruments that have been put forward for discussion. 
A distinction will be made between  
  Doing nothing, 
  One-off measures,  
  Dynamic or automatic adjustment, and  
  Institutional adjustments. 
This will include a review of instruments that can operate at either EU or member state level or both. 
Preference will be given to those instruments that offer “systemic” solutions as opposed to ad hoc 
remedies, although systemic solutions are expected to take longer to implement.  
The  proposed  back-loading  in  this  report  is  considered  as  a  measure  to  address  the  “temporary 
imbalance between supply and demand in the ETS market”  
4.1  Doing nothing 
The objective of the ETS is to “promote GHG reductions in a cost-effective and economically efficient 
manner” (Art. 1 of the ETS Directive). Hence, the over-arching objective is cost-effectiveness of a 
politically given target. The fact that emissions reduction targets are being achieved at a lower than 
expected price is seen as an example of its helpful counter-cyclical action in times when companies 
face difficult economic conditions. Those supporting the ‘do-nothing’ option are backed by those, who 
fear  that  government  intervention  would undermine  efficacy,  i.e.  “make  matters  worse”.  One-off 
intervention may create a precedent for continuous interference, thereby making the ETS subject to 
changing political preferences. Others argue that action is needed to enable the ETS to ensure delivery 
of secondary objectives, notably decarbonisation.  
4.2  One-off (re-setting) measures  
One-off “re-fixes” describe measures that change the parameters of the market by a one-off decision, 
meaning that the system in the future functions under these new parameters. This includes increasing 
the EU 2020 unilateral target, a set-aside (i.e. a one-off withdrawal of allowances from the ETS) and 
an agreement on a legally binding unilateral 2030 EU reduction target.  REVIEWING THE EU ETS REVIEW? | 11 
 
4.2.1  Increasing the EU 2020 unilateral target 
One obvious answer to the low carbon price is to increase the unilateral EU target of 20% reduction by 
2020 compared to 1990 to a higher figure such as 30%. This would require a legislative process via 
co-decision. To date, politically, the likelihood of this happening is very slim, for economic reasons 
and because there is no clear international agreement to trigger the increase. Even if the target were 
increased, most likely changes would only take effect by 2015 at best, assuming that the EU decision-
making process would at least require 2 years from the proposal to the final decision (see also Figure 
4.1). This would also almost certainly mean an opening and re-negotiation of the current Directive, 
which many might wish to avoid. Such a re-negotiation might trigger a new debate on cost differences 
between EU member states and potential redistributive fixes. It would still not address the overhang of 
allowances. The need for withdrawing EUAs by means of a set-aside (see below), for example, would 
therefore remain (see IETA 2012, Grubb 2012).  
Figure 4.1 Effectiveness of reforms and possible timing: even if more effective, cap and design 
changes would take longer to implement 
 
Source: Adapted from IETA 2012, p. 37. 
4.2.2  Set-aside  
The Set-aside constitutes a supply-side baseline change to impose a new level of ambition, thereby 
accommodating a macro-economic change that is unrelated to the ETS. This would mean removing 
the current allowance surplus of around 1 billion or more allowances from the system, as suggested by 
the EP  Environment Committee (see also  Neuhoff et al 2012). Practically this could be done by 
withholding allowances from the auctions in Phase III, 2013–20. This has been under discussion in the 
context of the proposed Energy Efficiency Directive when it was before the European Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers.  
Using an ongoing legislative process such as the introduction of the Energy Efficiency Directive or the 
Comitology Procedure under the ETS Directive
22 would mean that there was no need to change the 
ETS Directive itself (see Grubb 2012 and Ruiz 2012). CDC (2012) also argued that “by framing the 
move  in  terms  of  re-aligning  complementary  policies,  and  increasing  the  stringency  of  the  ETS 
despite, it signals policy-makers’ desire to reinforce the credibility and effectiveness of the EU ETS as 
a policy”; essentially, a set-aside is expected to restore confidence in the EU ETS by providing a 
                                                   
22  This  regulatory  procedure  allows  the  Commission  to  add  predefined  implementation  details  to  existing 
legislation.  It  is  faster  than  the  co-decision  procedure  because  the  Council  of  the  EU  and  the  European 
Parliament cannot amend the proposal, but retain the right to block its final version.  12 | EGENHOFER, MARCU & GEORGIEV 
 
strong  price  signal  for  the  market,  simultaneously  contributing  to  the  secondary  objectives  of 
providing revenues for climate finance and of supporting international mitigation efforts.  
Estimates have shown that the withdrawal of the 1.4 billion tCO2e surplus without returning it by the 
end of Phase III could increase the allowance price to €20 per tonne of CO2e and thus generate annual 
auction revenues of around €1 billion in Greece and €2 billion in Spain and Italy (Grubb 2012). On the 
other hand, the allowance price range of the estimates is still too wide, between €10 and €30, showing 
the difficulty in eliminating strategic uncertainties through a set-aside. 
The downside is that the move could be interpreted as a way to circumvent the steps set out by the 
revised EUETS Directive and might be seen as a precedent for future market intervention, which is not 
provided for in the Directive. Thus it raises issues of stability and predictability. CDC (2012) also 
argue that it could be criticized on the basis of a lack of transparency or a consensus on accepted 
principles  for  this  or  any  correction.  This  criticism  could  be overcome  if  the final  decisions  can 
credibly ensure that underlying causes that gave rise to the measures are addressed in the future. This 
would point to a longer-term fix in due course. Grubb (2012) argues that the risks of bringing about 
additional regulatory uncertainty could be reduced if there is enough clarity about the basis for the set-
aside, such as the interaction with energy efficiency measures, about the basis for calculating the 
necessary quantity, about the circumstances under which it may be repeated, and about the conditions 
under which allowances might be returned to the EU ETS.  
It cannot be ruled out that major demand reductions will occur again, for example as a result of a 
prolonged  sovereign  debt  crisis  or  shale  gas  production or  consumption.  Therefore  a  number  of 
stakeholders  suggest  combining  the  set-aside  with  long-term  (beyond  2020)  tightening  of  the 
emissions reduction trajectory, or with new ETS design provisions that have more direct impact on 
stabilizing carbon prices (see UK Parliament 2011), or with both (see IETA 2012, Grubb 2012). These 
further options are outlined in the sections below. 
4.2.3  A legally binding unilateral 2030 reduction target 
Some stakeholders argue that the EU should set a legally binding 2030 absolute reduction commitment 
– as has been done in 2007 for 2020 – in line with the EU’s 2050 target. Such a move would over the 
longer term provide a more credible target, which eventually would also require the adjustment of the 
EU ETS cap.  
Although the revised ETS has set a legally binding cap in the form of a linear reduction factor, 
investors still have concerns with predictability. While one aspect of a lack of predictability is the 
uncertainty around international negotiations, another is the inconsistency between the current EU 
linear reduction factor and the actual EU 2050 target of 80-95% GHG emissions reductions compared 
to 1990, meaning almost total decarbonisation of the power sector. With reference to individual ETS 
sectors, the 2050 Low-carbon Roadmap suggests that power sector emissions should be 93-99% below 
1990 levels by 2050 and industry emissions should be down by 83-87%, if only to achieve the lower 
end of the full EU ambition at -79% to -82% (European Commission 2011, p.7).  
To bring the linear reduction factor into line with the EU 2050  targets, the current 1.74% annual 
reduction would need to increase significantly. Some offer a factor of 2.5% for the above-mentioned 
decarbonisation (e.g. Van den Plas, 2011), while the European Parliament Environment Committee 
officially  proposed  2.25%  as  part  of  the  negotiations  on  the  new  Energy  Efficiency  Directive. 
However,  recent  analysis  by  Öko-Institut  (2012)  suggests  that  with  a  factor  of  2.25%  without 
additional measures, the effect on the price in 2013 would be very low (+€1 per tCO2e) and only 
slightly higher in 2020 (+€2 to +€3 per tCO2e). If 1.4 billion tCO2e are set-aside in addition to this 
increase in the factor, and reintroduced between 2023 and 2026, the price effect in 2013 would be 
+€4.50 per tCO2e for 2013 and about +€15 per tCO2e for 2020. 
The advantage of setting a 2030 cap instead of adjusting the 2020 one is that 2020 is now so near that 
a  change  most  likely  will  have  almost  no  impact  on new  investments, while  increasing  costs  of 
compliance, and doing little to address the overhang of EUAs. A 2030 target might also be easier to REVIEWING THE EU ETS REVIEW? | 13 
 
agree upon. In order to avoid one-off adjustments in the future, they could be combined with rolling 
emissions caps, which are applied for example in the UK and Australia (see below). 
Many agree that although essential, a timely negotiation of a 2030 target together with an increase of 
the ETS linear reduction factor is insufficient on its own (Grubb 2012, IETA 2012, Öko-Institut 2012), 
especially considering its insignificant impact on the allowance price in the near-term. Therefore a set-
aside in the short-term has often been mentioned as necessary to complement any tightening of the cap 
(Grubb 2012, Öko-Institut 2012). This is because any revision to the cap requires a time-consuming 
legislative procedure including reopening the ETS Directive and it does not immediately remove the 
surplus  allowances  (see  Grubb  2012).  Figure  4.2  illustrates  this  by  showing  that  a  2.25%  factor 
without a set-aside would have little effect on the time it takes to eliminate the surplus. 
4.3  Dynamic or automatic adjustment provisions  
While the measures in the previous section have dealt with one-off ‘re-setting’ measures, this section 
will deal with longer-term fixes in the form of automatic stabilisers. Dynamic or automatic adjustment 
provisions describe structural or system solutions, which apply mechanisms that are inherent to the 
ETS design. They can be combined with re-fixes. This section will analyse different mechanisms of 
floor prices including an auction reserve price, the UK carbon price floor and option contracts. It will 
also present the “rolling emission caps” approach. 
4.3.1  Economic adjustments: Price Floors and Options contracts 
To better stabilise the amount and cost of efforts associated with meeting a target through times of 
economic change, a body of literature argues in favour of combining certain features of both price-
based and quantity-based instruments, to create so-called hybrid policies (see Weitzmann, 1974; Pizer, 
1997 for climate change).  Under these policies, minimum prices for emissions allowances can be 
established, generally known as price floors
23. Two approaches relevant to the current debate on the 
EU ETS are examined below: an EU-wide auction reserve price and unilateral member state carbon 
price floors, such as in the UK. Options contracts are presented as a third approach that provides an 
alternative for ensuring prices remain above certain levels. 
4.3.1.1  Auction reserve price (EU) 
The auction reserve price proposal (see for example the proposal by Shell in UK Parliament 2011) 
suggests setting a minimum reserve price below which allowances are not auctioned (see also Hepburn 
2006). Practically, an auction reserve price could be established for Phase 4 or already for Phase 3 
thereby giving a long-term carbon price signal and providing companies more certainty over the return 
on investment in abatement technologies (see Fankhauser et al., 2011). This could also meet policy 
objectives  such  as  limiting  the  downside  risk  of  low-carbon  investments,  and  protecting  auction 
revenues. Furthermore, this could ameliorate interaction issues between the ETS and complementary 
energy policies and could eliminate the need for further set-aside of allowances (Grubb, 2012). If 
introduced now at a level above the current market price, it would mean a temporary reduction in the 
supply of allowances, as auctions at which the reserve price was not bid for some allowances would 
see the corresponding EUAs set aside over time for resale at a later date. 
 
 
 
                                                   
23 Price ceilings, where maximum allowance prices are established to avoid too high costs of reaching stringent 
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Figure 4.2 Comparison of the effects of options to implement an increased linear reduction factor on 
the surplus in the EU ETS, 2013 to 2030 
 
Source: Adapted from Öko-Institut 2012, p. 49. 
Carbon price floors and ceilings have already been established in Australia and California (see also 
Box 4.1). Figure 4.3 illustrates how recent developments and post-recession projections made in 2010 
for the ETS allowance price would compare to the price “corridors” (combined floors and ceilings) in 
Australia (light colour lines) and California (dark colour lines). 
Figure 4.3 EU ETS Prices compared against Australian and Californian ETS price corridors 
 
Source: Adapted from Grubb 2012, p. 7. 
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Box 4.1 Price floors under the Australian and the Californian emissions trading programmes 
Australia: As part of the price floor arrangements for the first three years (subject to review for the years 
afterwards) of the flexible price period under the Australian cap-and-trade system, a minimum auction 
reserve has been set for the financial years 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18 (respectively 15, 16 and 17.05 
Australian dollars). However, this price floor is going to be removed after a recent agreement for linking 
with  the  EU  ETS.  Figure  4.4  shows  the  development  of  the  price  floor  until  2018  plus  a  forecast 
extension beyond that period (in the three years up to the cap-and-trade period starting 2015 there is a 
fixed emissions charge in the form of a carbon tax). 
Figure 4.4 Australian carbon tax and price control forecast (2012/13-2025) 
 
Note: Assumes inflation of 2% p.a.; takes current secondary CER futures price for 2015 delivery as a basis for 
the international unit price upon which the price ceiling is determined. 
Source: Adapted from Patay & Sartor (2012, p.6). 
California:  The  auction  reserve  price  under  the  California  programme  is  set  at  US$10  for  2013 
allowances
24 (indexed annually by 5% plus the rate of inflation, which is calculated by the Consumer 
Price Index). In Figure 4.4, this is denoted by “price floor”, while the reserve price tiers refer to price 
ceilings. 
 
Figure 4.4 Estimated Auction Price Floor and Reserve Price Tiers, by Year 
 
Source: Adapted from Horowitz et al. 2012, p. 4. 
                                                   
24 California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and  Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms, CAL. CODE 
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While technically speaking an auction reserve price appears fairly simple to implement, and is being 
used elsewhere in the world), there are a number of issues that would need to be settled (see e.g. CDC 
2012). They essentially relate to the level of the ‘right’ price, the effectiveness of this instrument for 
the  problem  at  hand,  the  respective  appropriate  timing  of  introduction,  and  what  to  do  with  the 
allowances that have not been auctioned. The latter problem is similar to that of allowances withdrawn 
by a set-aside, analysed above. In addition, it would require a change of the ETS Directive.  
The principal question is whether the continued existence of a reserve price would be more credible to 
investors than the current system. What is the “fair” reserve price on which stakeholders and member 
states  could  agree,  and  why  should  a  pre-agreed  level  be  preferred  to  the  market’s  assessment? 
Introducing an auction reserve price may also put downward pressure on future price expectations and 
it would keep prices at or close to the level of the reserve price for longer than otherwise would be the 
case.  
Caution is called for in the case where a price floor is proposed not only to address the risk of a very 
low carbon price, but to compensate for an insufficiently stringent emission trajectory (Neuhoff 2011). 
This would undermine the long-term link between the carbon price and the emission target. Grubb 
(2012) explains why and points out that in particular the auction reserve price design of a price floor in 
the EU ETS, under current conditions, should not be implemented on its own without a set-aside in the 
short term and a tightened long-term cap. Due to the accumulated surplus, few would purchase new 
allowances at the reserve price, but also few would want to trade what they have and would rather wait 
until the market catches up with the floor price years into the future. This would reduce auction 
revenues and would fix the price rather than allow demand to drive it through emissions trading.  
If a price floor is brought to the table as part of the negotiations for the 2030 targets and Phase IV 
caps, it may bring a signal for stability even before coming into force. It is also important that once 
introduced, a reserve price could secure additional reductions where successful renewable energy or 
energy  efficiency  policies  affect  ETS  sectors  –  if  such policies  drive  carbon prices  down,  fewer 
allowances would be bought at auctions and thus not enter the system (Grubb 2012). 
In addition, a general floor price is a rather inflexible tool. If future carbon reduction potential turns 
out to be much cheaper than anticipated (e.g. because of new technologies or lower economic growth) 
a high floor price could result in carbon reductions becoming needlessly expensive.  Such a price 
adjustment could undermine the primary objective of achieving a certain quantity of abatement at least 
cost (IETA 2012).  
A price floor would be subject to lobbying from different stakeholders. A price floor ultimately is a 
‘political’ price, subject to political interference and change and hence raises credibility issues (e.g. 
Zachmann, 2012). There is also a major question of whether EU governments could agree on the level 
of a floor price. 
Another problem with a price floor in the EU ETS is the considerable complexity it would create for 
linking with other cap-and-trade systems, especially because the initial calculations for establishing it 
normally reflect the economic dynamics of the region for which they are established (Fankhauser & 
Hepburn, 2009). The recent agreement for removal of price floors in the Australian ETS in order to 
link with the EU ETS
25 supports this, showing that avoiding it completely has been more politically 
preferable than negotiating a common price floor. 
4.3.1.2  Unilateral member state price floors  
An advantage of an EU ETS auction reserve price is that it would remove the actual or perceived need 
for EU member states to act unilaterally in this direction, such as recently done by the UK with its 
introduction of a carbon price floor. 
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The UK carbon price floor proposal is a regulatory/taxation policy that is intended to complement the 
ETS. Starting in April 2013, it will make suppliers of fossil fuels that generate power liable either to 
the UK Climate Change Levy or a fuel duty (see HM Treasury, 2010; Mackenzie, 2011). The carbon 
price support rates
26 for the UK Climate Change Levy and the fuel duty reflect the differential between 
the future market price of carbon and a specified floor price (see Figure 4.5). While essentially a tax, it 
has the effect of supporting the carbon price, although only in the UK.  
This means that there will be different carbon prices under the ETS across the EU, with UK companies 
paying  higher  rates  than  their  neighbours, raising  intra-EU  competitiveness  issues  for  the private 
sector. Such a unilateral move further reduces the carbon price for the other member states, thereby 
reducing  their  auction  revenues  and  compromising  least-cost  abatement  in  the  UK  (Sartor  & 
Berghmans, 2011). As the difference between the ETS price and the UK floor price is collected by the 
national government as revenue, the 12% redistribution to eastern European countries required from 
EU ETS auctions is foregone for that difference (Grubb 2012). 
Another criticism is that the carbon floor price overlaps with aspects of the contracts-for-difference 
provisions,  a  type  of  the  option  contracts  discussed  below,  also  introduced  as  market-stabilising 
aspects of the UK’s  electricity market reform. Price floors are a way of hedging the government 
against financial liability in option contracts, but the options themselves could be sold, generating 
revenue  upfront  for  the  government  (Pizer  2011).  Also  competitiveness  and  distributional  issues 
remain  (see  next  section).  Trying  to  “fix”  these,  such  as  the  attempt  by  the  UK  government  to 
compensate energy-intensive sectors, might complicate matters further (Grubb 2012). 
Figure 4.5 UK Carbon price floor illustration (in real 2009 prices and calendar years)  
 
Source: HM Treasury 2011, p. 16. 
On the other hand, the member state floor price is easy and fast to implement and can be geared 
towards the needs and preferences of particular member states, which can have different emphases 
within EU policy. With the EU (Lisbon) Treaty leaving the responsibility for the national energy mix 
in the hands of member states (Art. 194) as well as long-term national reduction commitments, there is 
some rationality in providing member states with tools to influence investment in the energy sector.  
                                                   
26 Carbon price  support rate will be applied to fossil fuels based on their carbon content.  The rate will be 
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4.3.1.3  Options Contracts 
Options contracts are seen as addressing some of the issues that arise through a floor price. Options 
contracts  describe  the  establishment  of  bilateral  option  contracts  between  public  institutions  and 
investors in low-carbon solutions. The public institutions would guarantee a certain carbon price to an 
investor through such a contract (see Ismer & Neuhoff, 2006). In case the realised carbon price is 
below the guaranteed price, the public institution (the option writer) would pay the difference to the 
investor  (the option holder).  Hence,  in  case  of  a  low  carbon  price,  potentially  detrimental  to  the 
competitiveness of low-carbon investments, the investor gets some compensation and reduces his risk. 
At the same time, if the public institution issues a large volume of option contracts, it creates an 
incentive for policymakers not to water down climate policies in the future. On the other hand, option 
contracts may create a conflict of interest for governments who are responsible for the policy that 
affects their financial liability. Policies that reduce the carbon price will have a direct budget impact 
through increasing the value of the outstanding options. This would increase the long-term credibility 
of the ETS (Zachmann, 2012). However, it would also mean that governments take on potentially 
financial  liability  through  the  options  contracts,  though  the  options  themselves  could  be  sold, 
generating revenue upfront for the government (Pizer 2011). In the case of falling carbon prices, the 
cost of buying allowances at the option price would thus be transferred to the taxpayer and might bring 
about distributional issues if allowances have been freely allocated to firms in the first place (see 
Fankhauser and Hepburn, 2009).  
A possible drawback is that – most likely – options contracts would be issued by member states. But 
different levels of options or contracts for different member states will – as is the case for the (UK) 
carbon price floor – signify that there are different carbon prices across the EU, unless all member 
states agree to coordinate and fix one EU-wide price (see Grubb 2012). 
4.3.2  A rolling emissions cap  
Another approach is to offer the possibility of flexibility – under defined rules – in target setting as has 
been done in Australia and the UK. For example, the Australian ETS now being introduced is built 
upon a fixed 5-year emissions cap, which is annually updated 5 years in advance for each subsequent 
year, but is always consistent with a longer-term reduction target already fixed by the Parliament. This 
feature of the Australian scheme attempts to combine a lagged flexibility to respond to unforeseen 
events by supply-side adjustment with some kind of predictability and credibility about the emissions 
pathway. 
Before 1 July 2015, the beginning of the Australian emissions trading scheme, the emissions caps for 
the first five years will be set. By the end of each year, the cap for the 5
th year into the future will be 
decided. Thus the first extension for the financial year beginning 1 July 2020 should be adopted before 
1 July  2016. The cap is approved by Parliament based on the advice of an independent Climate 
Change Authority. If the Parliament fails to make the necessary Regulation in time, a default cap will 
automatically be set at 12 million tCO2e below the previous year’s cap (The Parliament of Australia 
2011). The default reduction trajectory for the annual caps is consistent with Australia’s 2020 legally-
binding target of reducing GHG emissions to 5 per cent below 2000 levels, but continues indefinitely 
beyond 2020. In making its recommendation, the Climate Change Authority must take into account a 
range of relevant factors (see Parliament of Australia 2011), such as progress in reducing emissions 
domestically, international action, emissions credit supply, economic and social implications including 
those related to the carbon price etc.  
In the UK, rolling caps in the form of three 5-year “carbon budgets” for at least 15 years ahead have 
been adopted in order to meet the long term goal of reducing the country’s GHG emissions by at least 
80% below 1990 levels by 2050 (see e.g. UK Government, 2011a). These caps are at the national level REVIEWING THE EU ETS REVIEW? | 19 
 
and will affect primarily the non-ETS sectors of the UK economy
27. Although legally binding for the 
country as a whole, these caps do not require the submission of allowances by individual entities, nor 
do they involve trading. Instead, the carbon budgets are broken down by individual sectors, for each of 
which the government creates programs and policies that should ensure the meeting of the target. The 
main  lesson  from  the  UK  example  is  the  potential  benefit  of  creating  15-year  visibility  and 
predictability  of  mitigation  efforts  as  a  whole  and  among  sectors,  while  maintaining  regulatory 
flexibility  in  adjusting  each  subsequent  5-year budget  by  reference  to  the  changing  prospects  for 
economic development, available technology and mitigation ambition.  
Table 4.1 Carbon Budgets in the UK 
  First carbon 
budget 
(2008–12) 
Second carbon 
budget 
(2013–17) 
Third carbon 
budget 
(2018–22) 
Fourth carbon 
budget 
(2023–27) 
Carbon budget 
level (million tonnes carbon 
dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e)) 
3,018  2,782  2,544  1,950 
Percentage reduction below 
base year levels  23%  29%  35%  50% 
Source: Adapted from UK Government (2011b, p. 3). 
As there is no experience to date, it remains to be seen how well this approach will balance the 
competing demands of long-term visibility and medium-term flexibility in Australia and in the UK. 
There is a difficult balance to strike between the clarity and simplicity of a single long-term fixed 
target and the ability to adjust a rolling target so that it always points in the same direction, taking into 
account  changes  in  the  external  environment.  Another  challenge  is  the  credibility  of  the  newly-
established  Australian  Climate  Change  Authority  in  managing  the  market’s  medium-to-long-term 
allowance scarcity expectations (Patay and Sartor, 2012). For the EU the rolling caps approach also 
raises issues of governance, particularly on how an institutional structure can be designed to allow the 
EU  to  reach  consensus  quickly  on  a  regular  basis,  especially  if  annual  updates  to  the  cap  are 
contemplated. Nevertheless, the central idea of a five year forward rolling target could be discussed by 
the EU, and could be a way to address the issues with the linear reduction factor mentioned in the 
sections above. 
4.4  Institutional adjustment  
The fourth category of measures consists of creating regulatory bodies or new institutions, i.e. non-
automatic adjustment mechanisms that deal with the ‘management’ of the ETS. Two functionalities 
can be distinguished; one is the efficient functioning or management of the ETS whilst the other is to 
adjust the supply to demand. A new body could deal with either function or both. In the following 
sections, we will briefly examine both functionalities.  
Institutional adjustment will also require institutional adaptation in the EU and thus represent a longer-
term solution. However, it could be seen as a complement to some of the other proposals discussed 
above. This will be discussed in part 3 of this section. 
4.4.1  A management body for the ETS 
In  the  context  of  the  internal  European  Commission  discussions  on  the  back  loading  proposal, 
different  Directorates-General  provided  somewhat  different  information;  some  leaked  internal 
documents that proved to be market-sensitive. As a result, at one stage the market was moved by 
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around 10% based on information which appeared to have been leaked by a Directorate General of the 
European Commission. This happened after the European Commission had put into operation rules 
and practices on how to communicate market sensitive information, after similar incidents occurred in 
the early stages of the ETS operation. This has brought back on the agenda the question of how to 
improve management and communication of market sensitive information by the Commission and 
whether there is a case to delegate some operational activities to a separate body, if not an agency. 
More far-reaching is a proposal to delegate powers to a new or existing institution to manage the 
supply of allowances (e.g. Lewis & Curien, 2009; Curien & Lewis, 2012; de Perthuis & Trotignon, 
2012). Such an organisation would be tasked with taking account of developments outside the system 
in managing supply, for example by a price target. This could also include management of auctioning, 
including  front-  or  back-loading.  Developments  outside  the  ETS  could  include  the  progress  of 
international climate negotiations, supply and prices of credits, or the impact of other climate and non-
climate policies on supply.  
As long as this body’s mandate is restricted to ensure functioning ‘under the cap’, competencies of 
member states to decide on the cap are not touched. It would be a different matter if this body is 
adjusting the cap. This is dealt with in the next section.  
4.4.2  An independent (regulatory) agency or a Carbon Central Bank 
The most far-reaching idea is the establishment of an independent regulatory authority or a Carbon 
Bank with the objective of increasing long-term predictability and the ‘smooth’ functioning of the 
market including a continuous carbon price signal. This would include a mechanism to cope with EUA 
demand fluctuations by adjusting the supply, and possibly adjusting the cap. It has been suggested that 
an independent regulatory authority could control the supply of allowances similarly to the way the 
Federal Reserve Bank or the European Central Bank control the money supply in the US money 
market (de Perthuis 2011, Curien 2011, CDC 2012, de Perthuis and Trotignon 2012). Like automatic 
adjustment measures, this approach seeks to respond to a situation where the EU ETS does not have a 
short term supply-side adjustment mechanism, which in the view of some creates price volatility in 
response to demand shocks.  
While this approach has advantages in theory, and while there appears to be merit in centralising the 
various information-gathering authorities that will be monitoring the EU ETS from Phase 3, it also has 
its drawbacks. If it is to be a price-managing authority, this effectively requires centralising a large 
amount  of  control  over  the  carbon  market’s  emissions  trajectory  and  prices  in  the  hands  of  an 
independent bureaucracy. The Bank would need to be equipped with enough capital to give it the 
power to intervene and to protect it against attempts to break it. There are many in the market who 
would also caution against introducing a powerful source of intervention and potential inefficiency 
and  political  uncertainty.  In  addition,  the  current  demand  shock,  for  example,  would  require  a 
significant  ex-post  change  in  the  EU  ETS  emissions  cap  trajectory  to  restore  the  market  to  an 
allowance deficit (e.g. de Perthuis 2011). It would also require an agreement on the ‘right’ price.  
Most importantly, the establishment of a Carbon Bank or a similar institution raises numerous EU 
institutional issues, notably what the legal and political conditions for it would be. This in turn will 
have important bearings on the design. As this is a complicated legal matter, the following section will 
only briefly touch upon these conditions.  
4.4.3  Institutional feasibility and preconditions 
Assuming that both the EU institutions and member states accept the delegation of the management or 
even cap-setting to an independent body, the next question is about the institutional feasibility of an 
adjustment mechanism while ensuring that it has sufficient legal and political independence.  
Agencies  are  a  common  feature  of  the  EU  institutional  landscape.  However  most  fall  into  the 
categories of so-called ‘ordinary agencies’ with little or no powers, or ‘pre-decision agencies’ that 
provide  the  European  Commission  with  non-binding  opinions.  Only  a  few  are  decision-making REVIEWING THE EU ETS REVIEW? | 21 
 
agencies that can take binding decisions, but even these can hardly be compared with ‘true’ regulatory 
agencies.  If  they  have  decision-making  power,  they  usually  have very  limited  competencies  of  a 
clearly defined technical nature. Examples are the Office of Harmonisation for the Internal Market 
(OHIM),  the  European  Union  Air  Safety  Agency  (EASA)  or  the  European  Chemical  Agency 
(ECHA)
28.  They  are  governed  under  EU  public  law  with  their  own  legal  personality  and  are 
established by secondary legislation in order to accomplish a very specific technical, scientific or 
managerial task. One standard feature of the agencies is that they cannot adopt binding decisions with 
regard to private actors. 
This structure is not a question of political choice. It is rather based on EU case law, centred on the so-
called Meroni doctrine. According to this doctrine, delegation of powers to independent agencies must 
be limited to implementing powers clearly defined and entirely supervised by the delegating institution 
on  the basis  of  specific  and  objective  criteria.  Put  differently,  this  means  that  delegation  cannot 
concern discretionary powers involving a margin of political judgement.
29 While the Lisbon Treaty 
post-dates  this  jurisprudence,  it  does  not  contain  provisions  that  would defeat  application  of  the 
doctrine per se.  
Hence, as long as the work of a possible “economic adjustment body” remains technical in nature, 
leaving political discretion in the hands of the EU institutions, there are possibilities within the EU 
Treaty to establish such a body, for example by changing the ETS Directive.  
The  recently  (2011)  established  Agency  for  the  Coordination  of  Energy  Regulators  (ACER)  in 
Ljubljana possibly can give an indication on the possible remit of an “economic adjustment body”. 
ACER’s mandate is to “complement and coordinate the work of the National Regulatory Agencies 
(NRAs), at  EU level”. Its competences include preparing Framework Guidelines which will form 
the basis  of  EU-wide  network  codes  (drafted  by  the  European  Network  bodies);  taking  binding 
individual  decisions  on  terms  and  conditions for  access  and operational  security  for  cross  border 
infrastructure if NRAs cannot agree; giving advice on various energy-related issues to the European 
institutions; and monitoring and reporting to the European Parliament and the Council. 
30  
The role of a body like ACER as part of the “economic adjustment mechanism” could be to undertake 
technical analysis on the need or lack of need to adjust the cap, for example; laying the ground for the 
Climate Change Committee or some other body in the European Union’s decision-making structure to 
take  the  actual  decision.  To  guarantee  the  authority  of  the  body,  it  would  need  to  be  clearly 
independent. In the case of ACER, its independence is firmly backed up in legal terms and was 
enhanced by making it accountable to both the European Commission and the European Parliament.  
However  an  “economic  adjustment  body”  in  this  form  falls  short  of  an  independent  regulatory 
authority (IRA) that has far-reaching powers to either manage the ETS ‘under the cap’ or even to 
adjust the cap. The creation of such an ‘independent regulatory authority’ or a Central Carbon Bank 
under EU law would always require a revision of the EU Treaty. This would require agreement and 
                                                   
28 The Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) registers the Community Trade Mark in the 
European  Union.  The  European  Union  Air  Safety  Agency  (EASA)  implements  and  monitors  safety  rules, 
including inspections in the Member States, provides type-certification of aircraft and components, as well as the 
approval of organisations involved in the design, manufacture and maintenance of aeronautical products and 
authorises  third-country  (non  EU)  operators.  The  European  Chemicals  Agency  (ECHA)  focusing  on  the 
implementation of the EU’s chemicals legislation.  
29 The Meroni doctrine goes back to a 1958 European Court of Justice judgement and has been applied ever 
since also by the European Commission and is supported by all the memoranda from the Commission’s Legal 
Service and also by the main literature on Community law.  
30 ACER is made up of a) a Board of Regulators comprising of senior representative and one alternate of the EU 
Member States' 27 national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and one non-voting Commission representative; b) an 
Administrative  Board  comprising  9  members  and  one  alternate  for  each,  of  which  2  members  (and  their 
alternates) are appointed by the European Commission, 2 (and their alternates) by the European Parliament and 5 
(and their alternates) by the Council; c) a Director; and d) a Board of Appeal. 22 | EGENHOFER, MARCU & GEORGIEV 
 
ultimately ratification by all member states, and in some cases possibly a referendum. Not only are 
such changes lengthy procedures but they also require a high-level political will and consensus among 
member states and the EU institutions. At the moment it is not clear whether this political will exists. 
Some member states, even they if they were to agree on the usefulness of such a new institution, could 
still be opposed to any sovereignty transfer. Some member states may oppose the creation of a Carbon 
Central Bank or an equivalent organisation for reasons of principle.  
A second option is to establish the carbon bank via intergovernmental agreement among the Member 
States. The bank could be incorporated under the laws of a Member State (e.g. Luxembourg) with 
member states as shareholders with back office support provided by the European Investment Bank, as 
is the case with the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). As the operation of such a bank 
is  to  facilitate  the  functioning  of  the  ETS,  such  an  arrangement  would  satisfy  the  loyalty  clause 
contained in Article 4(3) TEU for extra-EU agreements among Member States. It still would need the 
consent by all member states but politically it might be easier to achieve. On the other hand, it will 
raise issues of independence and accountability.  
Thus,  whilst  the  creation of  a  Carbon  Central  Bank  or  an  equivalent  organisation  does not  raise 
fundamental institutional questions, the main challenge is about political feasibility. To date, there is 
little likelihood that member states would find agreement on the creation of an independent regulatory 
authority or carbon bank. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This report has first dealt with the question on whether the ETS is achieving its objectives. While there 
is  no  doubt  that  it  promotes  ‘reductions  in  a  cost-effective  and  economically  efficient  manner’, 
opinions differ on whether and if so, how the EU ETS could become a driver to shift investments 
towards low carbon technologies. Irrespective of this disagreement, which will have to be decided 
politically, this CEPS Task Force Report offers a review of the many options to adjust either the 
design  or  the  management  of  the  ETS  that  numerous  stakeholders  have  identified.  It does  so  by 
thinking through the pros and cons of each option so as to leave the reader with the decision on 
preferable solutions. 
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